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Reforming the WTO: the decision-making
triangle revisited
manfred elsig and thomas cottier
Introduction
Are international organisations (IOs) back in vogue?While most IOs were
treated badly for most of the cold war period, they have recently attracted
more attention, raising expectations in many policy areas in international
law and global politics. Some organisations, in particular the World Trade
Organization (WTO) clearly moved centre stage during the Uruguay
Round (1986–94). Ever since then, increasing pressures emanating from
globalisation processes have steadily improved the prospects for IOs to be
chosen to manage and coordinate emerging challenges. Growing needs to
address global concerns call for enhanced cooperation, if not advanced
integration of policy areas at the international level. The existing constitu-
tional framework of IOs, essentially shaped after the Second World War,
for want of a better alternative, has to serve as the backbone for taking
additional steps in identifying and shaping public goods, rights and obli-
gations of states and private actors. In the wake of financial crises, the
challenges of ongoing climate change and new pandemic threats, calls for
delegating more tasks to IOs have intensified. Yet most of the unfolding
potential is far from being utilised. International cooperation still hinges
on the reluctance of key actors to delegate sufficient authority to the
supranational level and to address appropriate structures and processes
of decision-making commensurate with the tasks ahead. Traditional per-
ceptions of sovereignty of the nation state loom large.
The WTO is not immune to these developments in world politics. The
creation of the organisation was assisted by a constitutional moment of a
liberal nature and the strong sponsorship of the transatlantic partners
after the end of the cold war. In recent years, a re-emerging interest
in protectionist measures, the slowing down of the liberalisation
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momentum and growing calls to improve the development-friendliness
of the system have proved a challenge to the functioning and the legiti-
macy of the WTO (Cottier 2010). While we continue to witness high
expectations as to what the WTO as a negotiation forum can achieve and
deliver, the slow progress in the Doha Round negotiations and the
scaling down of ambitions over the course of the negotiations indicate
the lack of adequate systemic capacity to respond to the challenges,
although it should be stressed that most of the problems rely upon
substantive issues and divergences. Yet, looking into the future and at
the new challenges on the table, it is evident that the existing structures
will face great difficulties in coping adequately; the structure–substance
pairings no longer match (Cottier 2010; Steger 2010). Thus, the story of
current and future WTO performance needs to be read in conjunction
with an assessment of the decision-making machinery (Gutner and
Thompson 2008; Elsig 2009a). Judging from the outcomes over the last
fifteen years, its performance does not look terribly impressive.
While IOs have again moved into the spotlight of contemporary
politics, the decision-making procedures negotiated under the post
Second World War Pax Americana and subsequent conventions and
practices have in most cases changed little over time. By and large,
decision-making is dominated by consensus diplomacy. Progress has
essentially been limited to the regional level, in particular within the
European Union, which has achieved a notable sequence of reforms to
decision-making over time. In global institutions, governance rules
which are designed at the stage of creation suffer from a type of ‘multi-
decision trap’. Actors learn to accommodate to the existing rules and
usually exhibit strong reluctance to engage in discussions on treaty
reform. They are risk-averse as far as experiments with new modes of
decision-making are concerned. In addition, there are many veto players
that expect to lose from a governance reform. This leads to a type of
decision-making trap from which it is hard to escape. The formal (and
informal) rules on how the WTO takes decisions in treaty-making have
changed little since the 1950s, whereas the number of participants and
the difficulties in finding consensual solutions have increased. By con-
trast, the judicial arm of the GATT/WTO underwent substantial reform
during the Uruguay Round (UR), introducing a two-tier system which is
essentially based upon majority ruling and the exclusion of veto powers.1
Finally, decision-making is further hampered by the existing cleavage of
1 This legalisation leap still remains rather a puzzle in the international relations literature.
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political and judicial avenues within the organisation (Cottier 2007;
Cottier and Takenoshita 2008). Thus the WTO, like many other IOs, is
confronted with a double challenge: how to address new challenges from
globalisation and how to reshape decision rules. This chapter discusses
the latter, focusing on the current system and suggesting experimenta-
tion with new forms of decision-making.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it reviews the current
decision-making triangle in the WTO, highlights systemic weaknesses
and posits that the current system is inadequate in the long run. Second,
it outlines key elements for a redesign and engages in a counterfactual
exercise as to the results of reform.
The Current Decision-Making Triangle
The current decision-making system related to treaty-making combines
three elements: the dominance of contracting parties, the consensus
principle and the logic of the single undertaking (Elsig 2010a). Below,
we critically discuss this decision-making triangle before arguing why it
will prove unsustainable in the long term. Figure 13.1 maps the elements
of the existing triangle.
Member-driven
While most IOs can be labelled member-driven, there is substantial var-
iance between them. The WTO scores high on this element, in particular
Member-driven 
Single
undertaking  Consensus 
Figure 13.1 The incompatible triangle
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in the legislative process of the WTO (on negotiations, see Elsig 2009a,
2010a). The contracting parties are dominating the rule-making process.
This amounts to one of the basic dogmas and beliefs of the system (Jackson
2001). Every negotiating group has a chairperson who is selected from
representatives of the contracting parties based in Geneva. The influence of
the chair is a function of his or her resources and knowledge, but is also
linked to decision procedures and the politicisation of the issue at stake
(Odell 2005; Elsig 2010b). Due to the length of negotiations, committee
chairs usually rotate during the course of a round.2 WTO staffers act
merely as assistants to the chair of the various negotiation groups. The
Director-General (D-G) is the only actor from the WTO (understood in
the narrow sense of an IO) who has some discretion and assigned powers,
albeit limited ones. The post of Director-General is the only supranational
chair and needs to be distinguished from elected or rotating chairs within
the organisation (Tallberg 2010). The D-G chairs the Trade Negotiation
Committee (TNC)3 meetings, consults informally with members and is at
times invited to the small group negotiations among the leading contract-
ing parties. The D-G also organises, jointly with the representatives of the
hosting governments, the Ministerial meetings that usually take place at
two-yearly intervals.4 Yet, the D-G has no formal agenda-setting powers
and works under the guidance of the members who define the outer limits
of the D-G’s autonomy.
While the GATT/WTO system has always been characterised by a
strong dominance of Geneva-based and (in the case of some contracting
parties) capital-based trade diplomats, existing evidence suggests that the
formal and informal role of the D-G and the WTO staff in negotiations
has partially decreased, in particular since the Tokyo Round negotiations
(Winham 1986; Elsig 2010b). In past trade rounds, WTO staffers were
more prominently involved in the drafting of texts and on various
occasions were asked by contracting parties to chair negotiation groups
to bring about convergence of positions and provide for linkages to
create workable solutions (Croome 1995). This type of Secretariat sup-
port is largely absent today. Put differently, delegation to the most
obvious supranational chair representing systemic interests (the D-G
and the Secretariat) is not occurring (Elsig 2010b).
2 Representatives of big powers seldom serve as chairs.
3 The TNC has been created for the negotiation round. It is formally under the authority of
the General Council which is the main decision-making body in day-to-day work of the
WTO. The highest authority is the Ministerial Conference.
4 There was no Ministerial meeting in 2007.
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Whereas the WTO operates with constituted bodies for decision-
making, such as the Ministerial Conference and the General Council as
well as other councils and committees, it lacks a formal executive steering
body as exists in most other IOs. Decision-making is mainly shaped by
informal and ad hoc processes. Although the creation of a delegated
steering body (executive council) was discussed during the ITO negotia-
tions and an executive committee was proposed in the Havana charter, it
never saw the light of day (Xu Yi-chong and Weller 2004). During the
GATT times, the idea was again revived as members created a consulta-
tive group (the G18) in 1975 that was active until the UR picked up speed.
The group was chaired by the D-G and included full and alternate
members, the difference being that while the latter had only one seat at
the table, the full members were allocated two seats. The group’s objec-
tives were to provide overall guidance and to serve as an important forum
of debate. The exclusive group met at regular intervals and consisted
mainly of high officials (Xu Yi-chong and Weller 2004: 804). While the
group was useful for recommending ways forward, it lacked any formal
decision-making power. The members of the groupmet between two and
four times a year (Blackhurst 1998: 33–5). Once the G18 stoppedmeeting
in 1987, other informal groups partially took over its role, such as the de
la Paix Group (composed of ambassadors) during the UR negotiations.
In the current round, various green room settings play a similar role to
that of the G18; however, all groups that have followed in the footsteps of
the G18 have been less institutionalised.5
As to the factors that explain member dominance and reluctance to
design new forms of delegation, three stand out. First, increased legal-
isation (and bindingness) of international trade law following the UR
negotiations has led many actors to pay more attention to the WTO
(Goldstein and Martin 2000). Actors have adjusted to the new system,
where a type of international court (with the Appellate Body at its top)
upholds or rejects findings of expert panels. These rulings at the appeal
stage cannot be blocked by the litigating parties and create systemic
pressures to implement domestically. The Appellate Body has also used
its delegated discretion in ways not always envisaged by contracting
parties (Van den Bossche 2006). As a consequence of an increased
impact of dispute settlement outcomes, negotiations are attracting
wider interest and negotiators are attempting to write more complete
5 The green room is an expression for meetings comprising 20 to 40 delegations in an
informal setting.
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contracts that will reduce the legal bodies’ scope for interpretation. Less
reliance on ambiguous treaty text automatically prolongs the negotiation
process, while reluctance to ask other actors (an elected board, the D-G
or the Secretariat) to take a more active stance increases. Moreover, as
theorised by James Fearon, the WTO is a good example of how negotia-
tions become more cumbersome and lengthy as participants internalise
the long shadow of cooperation with important distributional effects
(Fearon 1998). Negotiators bargain hard knowing that the outcomes
will last for quite some time and be difficult to modify in the not so
distant future. Overall attention paid to the WTO by its members is
reflected in the number of trade diplomats based in Geneva. The total
number of accredited trade officials rose from 233 in 1982 to 769 in
2006.6 Figure 13.2 indicates the growth of the average number of con-
tracting parties’ personnel dealing with WTO matters. The average
number of trade diplomats prior to the launch of the UR was 3.3 per
mission and had reached 8.2 in 2006. The data, however, also suggests
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Figure 13.2 Missions’ scaling up
Note: coded from 1982 every three years, no blue book available for 2003.
Source: WTO blue books, own calculations.
6 The growth of the WTO Secretariat is substantially lower during this period, rising from
43 to 118. This number, however, overestimates the number of civil servants involved in
negotiations (Elsig 2010b).
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that after the completion of the UR, overall mission size decreased for
some time before increasing again as a new trade round was prepared in
the late 1990s.
Second, we have witnessed increasing interest by developing countries,
which has been reflected by a surge of demands for accession to the
GATT/WTO and more active participation in negotiations. Given grow-
ing export interests, these new voices have challenged transatlantic
dominance and have called for developmental concerns to be taken up
more prominently by the system. Developing countries are relying on
various forms of coalitions, from broad ideological or geography-related
to issue-based groups to empower themselves.7 However, participation
has not been limited to existing or emerging new powers from the South;
smaller actors have also started to engage in the multilateral rule-making
system. Representatives of smaller developing countries have become
more active in negotiations as witnessed by the Cotton-4 initiative.8
Figure 13.3 illustrates the increase in developing countries’ membership
over time; in particular many advanced developing countries have joined
since the end of the 1980s.
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Figure 13.3 Membership of developing countries
Note: Defined according to the OECD classification.
Source: WTO website, own calculations.
7 On coalitions, see Narlikar 2003.
8 Sector initiative by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali to address cotton subsidies.
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In light of the difficulties for many developing countries in raising
their voice and participating actively in other global economic multi-
laterals (e.g., the IMF and the World Bank), they have few incentives to
delegate their newly discovered prerogatives within the WTO to an
elected board or to the D-G and the Secretariat.
Third, the lack of incentives for Geneva-based negotiators to yield
power to the Secretariat also relates to existing material and ideational
factors (Elsig 2010b). Geneva-based trade diplomats have little to gain
from an act of delegation to the Secretariat as their positions as masters of
the negotiations will be constrained (at least in the short term).
Furthermore, many contracting parties are concerned about an alleged
in-built agenda of liberalisation which is supported by the Secretariat
(Elsig 2010b).
Consensus principle
The consensus principle is a fine illustration of how norms have become
internalised in the WTO through practice despite the GATT and the
WTO formally envisaging the recourse to different majority voting
thresholds on the basis of one state, one vote (Ehlermann and Ehring
2004; Footer 2006; Steger and Shpilkovskaya 2010). The consensus
principle has become accepted among diplomats as the prime mode of
decision-making to the degree of being ‘taken-for-granted’, the final
stage of a norm cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This was also
reiterated during the UR negotiations. Article IX of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the WTO states: ‘The WTO shall continue the
practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947’.
A footnote to the provision defines consensus as follows: ‘The body
concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter
submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting
when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision’.
In the WTO, consensus thus applies among members present in
the room at both formal and informal meetings.9 Actors over time
have internalised consensus as the most appropriate rule given the
organisational context. There is ample anecdotal evidence as to the
power of discursive practices driven to a large extent by a logic of
9 Unlike affirmation, it does not require active support of a proposal, but is limited to the
absence of rejection and opposition. Acquiescence amounts to the predominant factor in
the operation of consensus.
296 manfred elsig and thomas cottier
PR
OO
F
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/2430700/WORKINGFOLDER/ELSI/9781107004887C13.3D 297 [289–312] 18.11.2010 4:48PM
appropriateness. Put differently, behaviour follows social rules defined
by what is conceived as right, natural and expected by the political
community actors are part of.10 It even applies to housekeeping matters
in the organisation. In the process of selection of the D-G in 1999, when
there was a clear deadlock over the candidates’ appointment, two
delegations were requesting a vote. In reaction to this demand, one
party put up its flag and stressed that ‘in this organization we don’t
vote’. This was followed by strong supporting statements by the over-
whelming majority of members.11
Such support has two major roots. First, consensus is felt to express
and guarantee sovereign equality of members. The principle is often
portrayed as the most democratic form of decision-making. This is
related to the argument that states have to give consent to interna-
tional agreements to be bound. All members formally enjoy the pos-
sibility of opposing and blocking decisions single-handed. It appears
to convey power. Second, the imbalance of economic and political
clout of members and the principle of one state, one vote renders
the application of voting virtually impossible without endangering the
organisation (Cottier and Takenoshita 2003). Outvoted powerful mem-
bers may choose explicit or implicit emigration and turn to exclusively
shaping trade relations unilaterally or through bilateral or regional
agreements.
Yet, while the consensus principle enjoys quasi-universal support
within the system, it could be labelled as a form of ‘managed hypocrisy’.
The idea of consensus produces a false feeling of equal participation and
leads to frequent frustration among many parties as they are excluded
from decision-making in small group negotiations. The small group
participation has been defined by the supplier principle and more
recently by the sheer economic power of a party to the WTO agreements
(Wilkinson 2009). Over the years, the GATT/WTO has gradually moved
from a bipolar-dominated to a multipolar system. It is de facto charac-
terised by a set of concentric circles where the inner circle is dominant
and predefines the potential win-sets (Putnam 1988). The member
composition of this circle varies slightly in relation to the issues at
10 The logic of appropriateness needs to be interpreted in relation to the logic of conse-
quences which attributes to actors an active rational behaviour, weighing different
options and strongly valuing the personal utility of potential outcomes (March and
Olson 2009).
11 Interview, 12 July 2006, Senior WTO trade official.
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stake.12 As we move outwards towards larger decision-making bodies
(from green room to Heads of Delegation meetings), deliberations are
characterised by ‘testing’ the likelihood of acceptance of potential small
group outcomes.13 This signalling game precedes the so-called ‘multi-
lateralisation’ process occurring towards the end of negotiations to bring
everyone on board. In practical terms, consensus amounts to a system of
decision-making reflecting strong differences in power and what is in
fact a highly uneven distribution of voting powers. Such findings call into
question the contribution of consensus to the democratic legitimacy of
IOs (Cottier 2009).14
Consensus is one element among many (Grant and Keohane 2005;
Elsig 2007). As shown above, in a consensus system, some clearly are
more equal than others while conveying the illusion of equality.
Consensus can lead to unintended effects at the domestic level weaken-
ing governments’ positions vis-à-vis particular interest groups among
their constituencies. Governments often face a dilemma. While an over-
all trade deal might benefit the economy as a whole, the formal veto
power invites domestic opposition at home to call for negotiations to be
blocked in the pursuit of sectoral interests. Put differently, a government
that faces well-organised domestic groups is under constant pressure to
use its veto powers on specific issues. If a government ignores some of
these calls, it will have to explain to its constituencies, at high political
costs, that blocking negotiations in a particular sector is incompatible
with overall interests in the multilateral trading system and the support
for other sectors, in particular its export industries. As a result, govern-
ments opt more often than necessary for accommodating the calls of
vested interests. This undermines not only their credibility at home
(beyond successful rent-seeking groups), but also affects the govern-
ments’ position at the WTO, as trade diplomats are called upon to
explain why they engage in hypocritical and tactical conduct. The option
to fight and lose a battle in a democratic vote in a transparent manner,
12 In the current Doha negotiations, the key group includes the US, the EU, India and Brazil
(G4). Depending on the issues at stake this group is extended to include the participation
of Japan (G5), Japan and Australia (G6) and more frequently China.
13 The Heads of Delegation meeting is an informal meeting where all contracting parties
can participate.
14 Some argue that IOs cannot be democratic as they are composed of various types of
countries with different democratic and non-democratic political systems (Dahl 1999).
Such a conceptualisation makes a differentiation between the international and the
regional/national level and calls into question the application of domestically accepted
governance models to the international system.
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organised along accepted principles of majority voting dominating con-
stitutional processes, is not available.
Finally, consensus creates considerable imbalances with the system of
dispute settlement which no longer operates on the same principle of
blocking powers (Barfield 2001). While dispute settlement decisions
proceed on the basis of excluding losing parties from consensus and
can only be blocked by consensus of all members, legislative response to
rulings remains virtually impossible in between trade rounds. This, in
turn, exposes various panels and in particular the AB to taking the lead in
further developing the trading system, creating additional tensions and
strains within the system.
Single undertaking
Single undertaking was an invention of the UR. Towards the end of the
negotiations, the US and the EU were pushing for a package deal without
notable exceptions. This was largely based on a shared perception that the
Tokyo Round agreements, with optional adherence to the newly created
codes, allowed for free-riding and thus weakened the system overall and
left out developing countries from serious commitments and thus also
from being taken seriously. The Tokyo Round further developed GATT
disciplines, but these legal developments only applied to a limited number
of contracting parties. It failed to truly integrate developing countries
and left them largely outside the process of building the multilateral trading
system. This constellation created asymmetries which the unilateral app-
lication of most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment could not remedy in a
satisfactory manner. Treaty relations based upon GATT resulted in asym-
metric rights and obligations.15 The US and the EU thus pressed for a
treaty that all parties had to accept in its entirety. Developing countries
were granted longer periods of implementation while special and differential
treatment (S&D), in terms of substantive rights and obligations, remained
marginal and largely ineffective (Cottier 2006). In addition, pre-existing and
revised GATT agreements were incorporated into the newWTO legal frame-
work, but did not apply to those members that abstained from joining the
newly created organisation (Steinberg 2002). This transatlantic ‘go-it-alone
power’ demonstration left other parties no choice but to accept the new
15 In addition, important incentives to legal restructuring were lacking in developing
countries, often increasing gaps between developing and industrialised countries rather
than closing them.
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treaties (Gruber 2000). It is only with respect to a few sectoral agreements that
members retained the right to abstain, such as in government procurement.16
The current trade round started with parties agreeing on a single under-
taking approach. Parties strongly advocated the negotiation logic that
‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. This was one of the lessons
learned from the UR negotiations. While the single undertaking worked in
the UR to produce a significant outcome, it seems that actors have now
adjusted to the logics of a single undertaking project. Single undertaking
is no longer a comparable driving factor providing negotiations with
much needed linkages. VanGrasstek and Sauve´ observe that ‘paradoxi-
cally, instead of encouraging bold deals by causing each country to focus
on those parts of the package that they most dearly desire, the single
undertaking might promote timidity by causing each country to focus
on those things that they most fear’ (2006: 858).17 The reason for this
timidity is not only a question of fear, but a type of inherent negotiation
logic among contracting parties that being a first-mover in terms ofmaking
a meaningful concession is seen as a disadvantage as subsequent pressures
on the other parties to follow cannot be maintained (Elsig 2009b).
Why it doesn’t work
The difficulties in reaching agreement and in concluding a trade round
are manifold. Partly, they relate to the substance and partly to the design
and modes of decision-making. In this chapter, we argue that the current
triangle of decision-making is unsustainable in the long run. While the
triangle worked for the UR negotiations, it has already shown its limits in
the current round. The system has led to a sort of decision trap from
which it is hard to escape. An obvious symptom of structural failure is
that contracting parties are not moving towards final negotiations and
face each other with a set of minor concessions and major demands over
the long negotiation cycle.18 The problem has also been identified as an
adjusted version of ‘endless-cycling’ (Elsig 2010a).
16 However, it needs to be noted that the commitments in the second pillar of the WTO
(General Agreement on Trade in Services – GATS) vary substantially.
17 An additional practical problem for negotiators relates to the assessment of benefits (and
thus reciprocity) for concessions negotiated across issue areas.
18 When negotiations are stuck in Geneva, negotiators turn to high-level political fora
(e.g., G7/G8 or G20) to provide the necessary impetus to allow for finding a zone of
agreement. Evidence from this round suggests, however, that little momentum is
produced from these types of Ministerial gatherings.
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Two important transformations will further expose the limits of the
current system. First, the WTO has moved from a regime focusing
predominantly on reciprocal lowering of tariffs to a regime addressing
challenges beyond the classical border adjustment policies. The bulk of
WTO negotiations today deal with non-tariff barriers in different regu-
latory areas, ranging from technical barriers to trade to subsidies, services
and intellectual property. This is likely to increase further in the future.
The WTO will be confronted with an increasing complexity of trade
regulation entailing complex issues of trade and environment (climate
change), investment and competition issues, or human rights and social
standards. While the UR agreements were essentially about creating and
reforming the system, with the Doha negotiations the system moves
further towards addressing commitments on internal support and dis-
ciplines on domestic regulation within the existing framework. Future
negotiations will be structurally even more complex than current ones.
They not only include more issues relating to domestic regulation as
opposed to market access, but increasingly they entail more interfacing
with issues dealt with in other IOs (Chapter 9). The second transforma-
tion relates to the waning dominance of the transatlantic partners. The
world has moved into amultipolar systemwith amultitude of key players
(Chapter 6). The process of multilateralising bilateral deals can no longer
be expected to work. More players are in fact in a position to exercise veto
powers than before. The process therefore needs to be inclusive from
the very beginning. All of this requires rethinking of decision-making
processes and modes.
Reforming the System
Incremental change?
As to the question of whether modifying any of the three elements might
suffice to break the decision-trap, we suggest some scepticism. Let us
briefly look at the three potential combinations and engage in a type of
contrafactual reasoning of expected results.19
Consensus andmember-dominance (but issue-based). Scenario 1 relates
to weakening the paradigm of the single undertaking, while leaving other
elements of the triangle unchanged. A so-called issue-based approach
19 This exercise is inspired by the analogy to the ‘inconsistency triangle’ (or ‘unholy trinity’)
widely discussed in relation to monetary policy choices.
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(with continued application of the consensus principle and member
dominance) would lead to a system where only minor issues are
addressed successfully.While some scholars argue that the opt-out clause
on TRIPS and Public Health illustrates that the existing system can find
workable solutions to issue-based problems, the empirical evidence of
this (rare) case seems far from conclusive (Drezner 2007). Another type
of issue-based approach is experimenting with variable geometry, in
particular the idea of a critical mass approach to decision-making as
sketched by theWarwick Commission (2007).20 Yet, as long as consensus
applies to these initiatives (in the sense that they shall not affect the rights
and obligations of parties not participating), little is to be expected to
come out of this process (Elsig 2010a). Veto powers are plentiful and free-
riding possibilities will not create sufficient incentives to ambitiously take
up new concerns through such differentiated cooperation.
Consensus and single undertaking (but delegation). Scenario 2 foresees
the strengthening of the supranational character of the organisation by
allowing for additional delegation either to the D-G and the Secretariat;
more powers to the chair; or the creation of a managing or executive
board. Delegation would lead to a situation where much of the politics
(informal negotiations) between contracting parties would be supple-
mented by the involvement of a supranational actor. This combination
has the potential for speeding up the process as more delegation to a
supranational actor assists in tackling agenda-setting problems and
endless-cycling. However, as long as consensus and single undertaking
prevail, the veto power of many contracting parties will make any con-
clusions difficult. Proposals by the Secretariat or the ‘empowered’ chair
could be easily blocked and an executive board would have to settle for
the lowest common denominator.21 Credible signals from veto players
early in the process of making new rules will have a negative impact on
the prospects of this scenario.
Member-dominance and single undertaking (but recourse to weighted
voting). Scenario 3 might represent the most promising partial reform.
However, it signifies probably the most controversial change as it departs
from the practice of a well-established internalised norm and has no
significant precedent in the GATT/WTO regime. On the positive side,
moving towards forms of weighted voting (in case consensus fails) would
20 See also Low (2009).
21 There might be a different dynamic when the Executive Board meets at the Ministerial
level (see next section).
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not change members’ active involvement in the negotiation process. On
the contrary, it could even increase participation as actors cannot fully
anticipate whether they will end up as part of the majority (the winning
coalition) or the minority (the losing coalition). Moreover, the dictum of
the single undertaking would allow for the creation of additional oppor-
tunities through cross-linkages compensating members for being in the
minority group on some issues. The overall success clearly depends on
the willingness of those in the minority to accept policy outcomes
supported by a large percentage of members. The increased input legiti-
macy (through participation) could to some degree address concerns of
exclusion and increase acceptance (Elsig 2007).
The reshaping of decision-making: looking beyond Doha
The triangle has proved unsustainable in terms of producing tangible
results. While adjustments to the existing system have been proposed
(Warwick Commission 2007), incremental reform will not overcome
the challenges illustrated by a brief counterfactual thought experiment.
A more important far-reaching redesign is necessary. A reform of the
system needs to address all three elements simultaneously, supported by
a more streamlined decision-making system that allows the WTO to
tackle the future problems related to global trade regulation.
The biggest obstacles are linked to the reluctance of members to cede
control and to move away from the consensus principle. Yet, an ortho-
dox reading of the Westphalian system turns out to be more of a myth
than reality (Krasner 1999).22 Concerns over sovereignty in particular
find manifestation in the positions of many emerging economies
(in particular those that have recently gained international political
and legal recognition). After years of playing second or third fiddle to
the big trading powers, many developing countries have rediscovered the
consensus-driven organisation and do not want to give up their newly
acquired possibilities of using the veto power that consensus indirectly
offers. However, it remains unclear whether veto power is equally dis-
tributed across the membership as argued above, and whether members
dependent upon access to large markets can afford to use such powers.
Final negotiations will most likely hamper efforts for the majority of
22 Moreover, it needs to be revisited under conditions of a multi-polar world where a
transatlantic consensus is no longer in a position to carry the day (see Chapter 6 in this
volume).
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contracting parties to effectively use veto power to advocate their vital
interests.
A look at the most advanced IO in world politics, the EU, allows for
some optimism that states can overcome existing obstacles to increased
delegation over time. The EU has not been built in one day, and crises
were used to further deepen integration. In the 1970s, the European
Community suffered from integration fatigue and economic problems
illustrated by the empty seat politics of French President De Gaulle and
growing protectionism within the Community. Yet, the Community
managed to overcome its stagnation. Over time the EU embarked on a
set of constitutional reforms moving from consensus to qualified major-
ity voting in many areas.23 The recent Reform Treaty turns to a system of
a double majority on the basis of one state, one vote (55 per cent of
members) and, in addition, a quorum of 65 per cent of the overall EU
population. European integration was also driven by the supranational
impetus from the European Commission (largely backed by the
European Court of Justice), which had been granted some autonomy
through agenda-setting prerogatives in decision-making (Alter 1998).
Finally, the EU has moved over time from big package deals in
Ministerial settings towards a more advanced system of decision-making
with the objective of taking up policy issues as they evolve and need to be
dealt with.
Below, we sketch five elements that need to be addressed simultane-
ously in order to engage in efforts at the reform ofWTO decision-making
(see Figure 13.4).
Strengthening the supranational character. A comparison with IOs of
similar importance suggests a variety of delegation options. Various
models could be envisaged ranging from allocating more discretion to
chairpersons, strengthening the role of the WTO Secretariat and staff to
creating an executive body. As argued above, the WTO suffers from an
endless-cycling problem. It needs to overcome obstacles to allow it to
move from the process of tabling proposals towards the true bargaining
stage. In this respect, a growing membership has naturally increased the
transaction costs of finding agreement. In addition, zones of agreement
diminish with size of participants. Therefore, delegation to a suprana-
tional actor can potentially unblock the situation. A supranational actor
can work as broker by setting a type of focal point in the form of tabling
new treaty texts for discussion. This marks the end of a period of
23 This applies in particular to the first pillar of the EU.
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discussions and deliberations and leads actors towards the business of
true negotiations.
Looking beyond negotiations, a way to strengthen the supranational
character of the WTO is to give more powers to the D-G and to consider
creating at least one of two types of executive boards. The first executive
board could institutionalise the informal and ad hoc processes of green
room negotiations. A new Consultative Body (CB) of Ambassadors
under the chair of the Director-General would assume various functions
in managing the organisation, namely appointing key personnel of the
Secretariat, chairs of committees, and adopting budgetary allocations. It
would also assume negotiating functions currently practised in the green
room process, interfacing different negotiating agendas. Negotiating
committees could call upon the CB to settle unresolved issues. The CB
would report to the General Council and the Ministerial Meeting. The
CB would attempt to reach consensus (in the shadow of voting), yet
actual voting would only take place at a later stage (General Council or
the Ministerial Meeting).
In addition to (or instead of) the CB, one could consider the option of
creating a Ministerial Board (MB) comprising ministers who would give
overall guidance and could be called upon to move dossiers forward. The
MB would meet regularly and take stock of the negotiation processes and
the operation of the WTO. The lack of ministerial involvement in trade
policy beyond Ministerial Meetings, thus merely in the concluding
More delegation 
More issue-based Streamlining 
More voting 
Supply-side support 
Figure 13.4 The new pentagon of decision-making
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phases, may be an important factor in declining multilateralism. It is no
surprise that ministers pay more attention to bilateral agreements where
results can be directly influenced and achieved. Ministers have not
developed ownership and stewardship of the organisation. They are
not critically involved in shaping the agenda of the organisation, nor in
the appointment of key personnel including the D-G and the Appellate
Body. They do not feel responsible, and the task of moving the WTO
forward falls heavily upon the shoulders of Geneva-based ambassadors
and officials in national capitals. They are involved in defining the
financial envelope of the organisation and its role and tasks in defining
aid for trade and trade facilitation. Ministers are not involved in shaping
relations with other IOs. The emergence of the G-20, largely dominated
by finance ministers, calls for a definition of the proper body and role for
trade ministers to meet securing appropriate representation of the
membership.
Executive boards would be composed of key trading nations with
permanent seats. In addition, other states would be part of the board
subject to a formula of participation on the basis of rotation, securing
adequate geographical representation and representation of industrial,
emerging, developing and least developing countries and existing
coalitions.24
From consensus towards qualified majorities. If IOs are not to become
obsolete in the long run, they need to accommodate some form of
qualified majority voting that goes beyond the one state, one vote for-
mula. If the WTO system is not able to offer timely solutions to the
existing challenges in the trading system, uncoordinated efforts to engage
in forum-shopping will continue whereby states attempt to compensate
for lack of outcomes. We observe in the context of the GATT/WTO
regime that alternative regimes are again replacing the WTO in its
liberalisation agenda, be it unilaterally, bilaterally or in the regional
context. Yet, the lack of change is strongly related to existing mindsets
of the trade diplomacy community. There is still a dominance of actors
arguing for an international–national dichotomy, attributing to interna-
tional politics a sui generis character rooted in realist thinking. Yet there
is an argument to be made that governance layers are becoming increas-
ingly blurred (Cottier 2009).
24 It could be envisaged that allowance would be made for different representations to the
boards so that the composition of the CB and MB would not fully overlap.
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There are various forms and ways of taking recourse to voting.
Different models could guide the development of a new design which
offers an overall fair balance of rights and voting powers (Cottier and
Takenoshita 2003, 2008). A norm that seems most likely to receive
support in the long run and finds legitimisation in various philosophical
conceptions of governance is a type of double majority.25 A simple
model, as adopted in the EU Reform Treaty, would define the majority
as being based on a qualified majority of states and a qualified majority
of people who are affected by international trade rules, leaving other
factors aside.
Yet the nature of the decisions may also affect the form of qualified
majority to be applied. Not all decisions at an international level have
similar repercussions in the domestic context, whether the WTO elects a
new D-G, deliberates on the research agenda of the institution, manages
the organisation’s budget or agrees on stringent rules of intellectual
property rights in new areas. There should be another effort to reflect
on the potentials created by voting majorities that are defined by policy
issues and their degree of societal intrusiveness. A new system should
strive to find a more suitable match of substance and decision-making
structure. Developing a doctrine of primary and secondary sources of
WTO law would allow the definition of different avenues of decision-
making, ranging from consensus on a few fundamentals of the system to
qualified majorities for adopting and implementing rules. It would allow
a distinction to be made between work within and outside trade rounds
(Cottier 2010).
Streamlining decision-making processes. Alongside the strengthening of
supranational elements and the selected application and use of majority
voting systems, overall processes need to be more clearly defined and
decision-making processes streamlined. Various existing committees con-
tinue to serve as platforms for agenda-setting, information exchange,
deliberation and negotiations. Broad participation would allow for various
ideas and positions to be advocated reflecting variance of interests among
the existing membership. Timelines are needed for the elaboration of
new rules and regulations. In particular, when issues get blocked there
should be a quasi-automatic mechanism to refer the issue to the executive
boards, first the CB and then the MB, if no agreement is possible. Over
time, the committees would have two functions. In the early stage of
25 Other models can be developed, taking into account factors such as shares in interna-
tional trade, openness to trade and population size (Cottier and Takenoshita 2003).
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regulation, they would develop and narrow the scope and content of future
regulation and later they would transform into decision bodies where
they would deliberate suggest treaty texts and, at a defined stage, accept
or reject proposals. This will allow the definition of a regulatory time
frame within which new issues are to be addressed (with some flexibility
to allow for rejections and revisions of proposed treaty texts). The General
Council (composed of ambassadors or ministers) would meet periodically
to assess progress, exchange views and adopt or reject proposals that are
produced by different negotiating bodies.
Moving beyond the single undertaking. The idea behind the move
towards more issue-specific rule-making is nurtured by the demand for
issues to be addressed more quickly. Trade governance in the twenty-first
century cannot wait for a round to be concluded before a pressing issue
can be tackled that was not already on the agenda at the onset of that
round. In order to address the danger that lack of linkages will block
progress, the system should still rely on types of horse-trading at the level
of the Board, or subsequently at the Ministerial level. It could also be
worth considering the idea of mini rounds. More frequent Ministerial
meetings at shorter intervals should help create a more common under-
standing of the challenges awaiting the trading system and the creation of
a managing or executive board (see Scenario 2 above) under the chair-
manship of the D-G should assist in elaborating timely answers. In
addition, if issue-specific rule-making based on a new design of decision-
making should prove difficult, the option of variable geometry (or what
has been called more recently ‘critical mass’) should be available for
actors without too onerous conditions attached (Low 2009; Elsig 2010a).
In addition, the idea of graduation should be further explored (Cottier
2006). Differential rights and obligations essentially emanate from
the philosophy of progressive liberalisation in GATT and GATS, but
new Agreements, such as the TRIPS Agreement, have adopted essentially
uniform standards of protection for all members alike. Ways and means
to transform the idea of progressive and individualised liberalisation into
the realm of uniform regulation of non-tariff barriers should be sought.
Instead of particular provisions and exemptions for developing and least
developed countries, the suggestion is to combine single standard rules
with economic factors and indicators reflecting the competitiveness of a
sector or economy. These factors and indicators will determine whether
to trigger the application of the rule and discipline at hand. Prior to this,
members would not be subject to it. This approach brings about gradu-
ation in terms of legal obligations, commensurate with the level of
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competitiveness.26 The difficulty and challenge will be to find and agree
upon appropriate indicators. Economists are called upon to develop
them in coming years.
Supply side support. Finally, what we have learned from EU integration
is that the creation of more integrated markets also calls for additional
auxiliary instruments to support weaker states. Given unequal national
and regional starting points, efforts have been made through infrastruc-
ture projects and other types of welfare transfer to allow weaker actors to
benefit from the single market. In the context of the WTO, general
welfare transfer seems too ambitious, yet initiatives that address supply-
side constraints to the successful use of the existing system need to be
strengthened and cooperation with other IOs intensified (see Chapter 9).
The current discussions on mainstreaming trade facilitation into the
WTO system and the aid for trade agenda both link the trade and
development communities in novel ways. The outcomes of this newly
found interest in the trade–development link will provide us with impor-
tant information as to the potentials for designing new support schemes.
Conclusion
Today’s international politics (in particular outside the realm of old
security issues) bears less and less resemblance to the classical billiard
ball model of nation states as advocated by realist scholars in the past
(mostly on a false presumption inWestphalian terms) (Waltz 1979). The
system today more closely resembles a spider’s web model of interde-
pendence (Nye and Keohane 1977) directing global governance towards
new prerogatives of an emerging Weltinnenpolitik. This calls for more
than a system of governance without government as some of the early
global governance literature suggests, but puts IOs right back into the
spotlight of governance.
In terms of reform, how realistic are the above suggestions in light of
the ‘stickiness of institutions’ and the inherent interests of decision-
makers in locking-in existing rules? Is anything other than incremental
change possible? It is clear that delegation of powers within the WTO
requires a firmer constitutional framework. The scenario outlined above
is meant to provide impetus to ongoing debates on the redesign of WTO
26 Importantly, it would allow the existing advantages of single undertaking (as all legal
instruments are binding for all members) to be combined with the flexibility of variable
geometry (within agreements, thresholds bring about differential obligations).
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decision-making. What might seem far-fetched and naïve today could be
labelled realistic and necessary in the years to come. Who would have
thought that states would give up their veto powers in relation to accept-
ing the creation of panels and the adoption of panel reports at the onset
of the UR negotiations? One necessary condition of a successful redesign
of the DSU was the existence of a majority view among members that the
panel system was dysfunctional and that something had to be done. The
current experience with the negotiation machinery has left many mem-
bers dissatisfied, opening up the opportunity to discuss additional steps
of delegation and new decision rules that have the potential to address
the incompatibility of the existing triangle of decision-making.
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